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HEDGE FUND REGULATION: 
A PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN HEDGE FUNDS’ 
EFFECTIVENESS WITHOUT SEC 
REGULATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American hedge funds hold $1.7 trillion in assets.1 In 2002, this figure 
was a far-more paltry $560 billion.2 In the same period, annual gross 
domestic product (GDP) rose from $10.05 trillion to $11.3 trillion.3 As a 
percentage of GDP, hedge fund assets under management have increased 
from 5.6% to 15% in the past four years.4 
This growth mirrored an improving economy after the stock market 
slump from the end of 2000 to 2002,5 and far exceeds the growth of mutual 
funds or the equity markets as a whole.6 Funds that invest in other hedge 
funds to spread risk, called funds of funds,7 have increased hedge fund 
accessibility for those who do not meet the investment thresholds traditional 
hedge funds usually require.8 Funds of funds also add liquidity for investors 
who are unable or unwilling to lock up substantial assets based on the terms 
required by each underlying fund.9 
The burgeoning hedge fund industry brought with it several high-
profile fund collapses. These collapses have resulted from risky investment 
strategies, questionable standards of ethical trading and extreme leveraging 
of assets.10 The effect of these collapses and the perceived growing threat of 
a hedge fund industry accounting for an increasingly large share of the 
economy led the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to draft and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, SEC and FBI Bare Teeth at Hedge Funds, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Sept. 27, 2006, at 1. 
 2. Donna Rosato, Investing; Hedge Funds for All? Well, Not Quite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2002, § 3, at 36. 
 3. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT-DOLLAR AND 
“REAL” GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (2006), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/ 
gdplev.xls [hereinafter U.S. GDP]. 
 4. GDP dollar amounts are in real terms and reflect U.S. dollars in 2000. 
 5. NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUS. CYCLE DATING COMM., THE NBER’S 
BUSINESS-CYCLE DATING PROCEDURE 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/ 
recessions.pdf. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part III.B. 
 8. Hedge funds typically have a minimum investment of $1,000,000. INV. CO. INST., THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MUTUAL FUNDS AND HEDGE FUNDS (2005), available at 
http://www.ici.org/funds/abt/faqs_hedge.html [hereinafter ICI]. 
 9. On top of existing hedge fund fees, see infra Part III.B, funds of funds charge an additional 
1% management fee and, possibly, a performance fee of up to 5% on return over a certain 
benchmark. James Altucher, Beware a Fund of Funds Relying on Gimmickry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 2006, at 12. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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implement rules to regulate U.S. hedge fund managers.11 However, a recent 
decision, Goldstein v. SEC,12 challenged the method the SEC used to 
require hedge funds to register with the SEC.13 The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule requiring hedge funds to register with 
the SEC.14 Though this “hedge fund rule” did not accomplish hedge fund 
regulation, the debate continues: some suggest that legislative action may 
be the next step to solve the perceived threat of unregulated hedge funds, 
while others argue no further action to regulate hedge funds is necessary.15 
This note argues that further hedge fund regulation is unnecessary and 
could actually negatively affect markets. First, this note concludes that 
increased regulation will not prevent system-wide market failure, and in 
fact, may abridge the abilities of hedge funds to deliver proven benefits to 
the economy.16 Second, the SEC should not regulate hedge fund managers 
because the agency does not have the resources to effectively do so, and 
hedge fund investors can adequately protect themselves since they are 
generally sophisticated investors; the SEC can more effectively protect 
investors by focusing on investors who are more vulnerable to market risk 
and who are less able to protect themselves.17 Third, SEC regulation may 
reduce hedge funds’ effectiveness and growth, and because hedge funds 
have added value to financial markets, unnecessary burdens on hedge funds 
should be avoided.18 Finally, this note proposes two preferable alternatives 
to increased hedge fund regulation, which address regulators’ concerns over 
providing investor protection and market stability, while allowing hedge 
funds to operate freely: the prevention of excessive leverage by 
counterparties and limiting hedge funds’ eligible investor pool.19 This note 
concludes that, in the current environment, increased hedge fund regulation 
should not be implemented because the potential benefits do not outweigh 
the costs and potential detrimental effect that regulation will have on the 
market. 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 
(Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule]. 
 12. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 13. Rule 203(b)(3)-2 “requires investment advisers to count each owner of a ‘private fund’ 
towards the threshold of 14 clients for purposes of determining the availability of the private 
adviser exemption of . . . the [Adviser’s] Act.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2. 
 14. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 884. 
 15. See, e.g., Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment 
Advisers Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2147, 2149 (2005) (arguing that “registration [is] the proper 
method of dealing with . . . risks posed by the hedge fund industry”); Hedge Funds and 
Independent Analysts: How Independent Are Their Relationship?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20–22 (2006) (statement of Joseph McLaughlin, Partner, Sidley 
Austin LLP, Managed Funds Association). 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
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II. THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY AND REGULATION 
The term “hedge fund” is not a technical term, nor is it legally 
defined.20 The term was coined in a Fortune magazine article by Carol 
Loomis about Alfred Winslow Jones, another journalist for Fortune, who 
developed the idea in 1949.21 Jones had written an article called “Fashions 
in Forecasting” that suggested covering long positions with short positions 
to hedge bets and offset shifts in the economy.22 One definition of a hedge 
fund is “any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, 
administered by professional investment managers, and not widely 
available to the public.”23 
Hedge funds have some distinction from their more voluminous 
relative, mutual funds; hedge funds are often organized as limited 
partnerships, while mutual funds are often organized as corporations.24 
Mutual funds generally operate on a relative return-basis, while hedge funds 
attempt to operate distinct from any benchmark, operating on an absolute-
return basis.25 
Mutual funds are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(Company Act)26 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers 
Act).27 Hedge funds have been able to avoid registration under both of these 
acts. To avoid registration under the Company Act, hedge funds use two 
exemptions. First, the Company Act defines the term “Investment 
Company” as “[a company that] holds itself out as being engaged primarily, 
or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or 
trading in securities.”28 The statute excludes “any issuer whose outstanding 
securities . . . are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons 
and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public 
offering of its securities.”29 And second, hedge funds are exempt from 
Company Act regulation by only offering securities to “accredited 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 21. Carol J. Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE, 237, 237 (Apr. 1966). 
 22. David Skeel, In the Untamed World of Hedge Funds, Rigged Deals and Manipulated 
Markets Help, 2005-DEC LEGAL AFF. 28, 30 (2005). 
 23. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 1 (1999) [hereinafter 
WORKING GROUP REPORT]. 
 24. See SEC DIV. OF INV. MGMT., REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES AND EXPENSES (2000), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm; IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF 
HEDGE FUNDS, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION 9 (2003) [hereinafter STAFF REPORT]. A mutual fund is an open-end company, 
which is “a management company which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable 
security of which it is the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (2000). A hedge fund, however, is a closed-
end company, which is “any management company other than an open-end company.” Id. 
 25. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 33. 
 26. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000). 
 27. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000). 
 28. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). 
 29. § 80a-3 (emphasis added). 
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investors,” those who meet certain financial thresholds.30 Thus, a hedge 
fund can escape the Company Act classification of a mutual fund as long as 
it has fewer than one-hundred beneficial owners, does not offer its securities 
publicly and accepts only accredited investors.31 The Company Act also has 
a slightly more general exemption for funds that are not publicly offered 
and in which only “qualified purchasers” invest.32 
Hedge funds have also traditionally avoided registration under the 
Advisers Act, which requires registration of “investment advisers”33 in 
connection with their business as “investment advisers.”34 However, this 
section excludes “any investment adviser who during the course of the 
preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and who neither 
holds himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts 
as an investment adviser to any [registered] investment company.”35 
Thus, by limiting the beneficial owners to one hundred, limiting the 
number of clients to fourteen and by refraining from offering to the public, 
hedge funds could traditionally avoid registration under both the Company 
Act and the Advisers Act. However, the term “client” in the Advisers Act 
was ambiguous; the statute did not determine whether an investment 
adviser’s client was the hedge fund itself or also included the investors in 
the hedge fund who are limited partners.36 And so, the applicability of the 
hedge fund exemption under the Advisers Act was unclear. 
In 2004, the SEC adopted a regulation defining the term “client” in its 
“hedge fund rule.”37 The regulation required that “for purposes of [the 
Advisers Act, hedge fund advisers] must count as clients the shareholders, 
limited partners, members, or beneficiaries . . . of a private fund.”38 Thus, 
although hedge funds with fewer than one hundred beneficial owners could 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See infra Part III.B. 
 31. It is crucial that hedge funds avoid classification under the Company Act because this 
legislation, which regulates mutual funds, would drastically limit certain hedge fund activity such 
as short selling and leveraged trading. See infra Part IV.A; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, 
at 11–12. 
 32. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 12–13. Qualified purchasers can be, inter alia, 
individuals or companies that have more than $5,000,000 in investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
2(51)(A) (2000). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000). 
“Investment adviser” means any person who, for compensation, engages in the business 
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or 
who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses 
or reports concerning securities. 
Id. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 35. § 80b-3(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
 36. See id. 
 37. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2004). 
 38. Id. 
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avoid registration under the Company Act, the hedge fund rule required 
managers of funds with more than fifteen investors to register with the SEC 
because the rule included investors as the clients of the investment 
adviser.39 
Registration under the Adviser’s Act would require that hedge funds 
register with the SEC, maintain certain business records, deliver disclosure 
statements to clients, and would impose a duty to fully disclose any material 
conflicts the adviser has with its clients.40 Further, the rule would prohibit, 
with some exception,41 a registered investment advisor from charging 
performance-based fees,42 which are an integral part of a hedge fund 
manager’s compensation.43 
In 2005, an investment advisor, Philip Goldstein, challenged the SEC’s 
regulation of hedge funds by its new definition of the term “client” in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.44 Goldstein, a hedge 
fund adviser,45 challenged the rule that required him to register with the 
SEC.46 The court sustained Goldstein’s challenge, holding that since an 
investment adviser’s fiduciary duties are to the fund, not the investors, the 
latter should not be considered clients.47 Further, the Advisers Act defines 
an advisor as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business 
of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to 
the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, 
or selling securities.”48 Hedge fund managers do not advise investors 
directly, but rather advise the fund, which holds assets of the investors.49 
The court concluded investors cannot be included in the count of an 
investment adviser’s clients.50 The SEC did not appeal the decision51 and no 
                                                                                                                 
 39. The adviser is the manager of the hedge fund, who is the general partner of the limited 
partnership. James Altucher, No Place to Hide in an Age of Transparency, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2006, at 11. (“A hedge fund is often structured as a partnership in which the manager is the 
general partner and the investors are limited partners.”). 
 40. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11. 
 41. Heightened financial requirements, investors with $750,000 invested with the adviser or 
with a net worth of $1.5 million, would exempt this prohibition. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 
xii. 
 42. Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 696–97 
(2000). 
 43. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 61. 
 44. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 45. Lynn Hume, SEC Won’t Appeal Court’s Hedge Fund Decision, THE BOND BUYER, Aug. 
8, 2006, at 44.  Goldstein is at Opportunity Partners LP.  Id.  
 46. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 874. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2000). 
 49. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 879–80. 
 50. Id. at 884. 
 51. Hume, supra note 45, at 44. 
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further action has been taken.52 It remains to be seen whether further 
legislative action will be initiated to accomplish SEC regulation of hedge 
funds. But risks associated with an unregulated hedge fund market do not 
seem to justify further regulator action. 
III. HEDGE FUND RISKS 
A. SYSTEMIC RISK: 53 AN UNREGULATED HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
DOES NOT THREATEN THE ECONOMY 
1. Relevance in the Financial Markets 
As hedge funds grow in number and in market share, their significance 
as a part of the economy also grows. While hedge funds hold far fewer 
assets than mutual funds,54 they have nonetheless proven to play a 
significant role in the nation’s economy.55 One reason for this is the extreme 
leverage many hedge funds use to enhance returns.56 A fund leverages its 
assets by borrowing capital to invest, expecting that the return on the 
borrowed capital is greater than the interest paid to borrow it.57 Since a 
leveraged fund trades with assets it does not own outright, adverse 
movements in the underlying fund could have widespread economic 
implications capable of affecting the entire economy.58 The downfall of 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a hedge fund, highlighted and 
practically defined this risk.59 However, the after-effects of LTCM also 
revealed the industry’s ability, through market discipline, to regulate itself. 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. (“Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox announced 
yesterday that the SEC will not appeal a federal appeals court’s decision to strike down its rule 
requiring hedge fund advisers to register with the commission as investment advisers.”). 
 53. As defined in a United States General Accounting Office Report, “[s]ystemic risk is 
generally defined as the risk that a disruption (at a firm, in a market segment, to a settlement 
system, etc.) could cause widespread difficulties at other firms, in other market segments, or in the 
financial system as a whole.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTERS, LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO FOCUS GREATER 
ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK 2 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 54. In August 2006, mutual funds held $9.59 trillion of the nation’s economy. INV. CO. INST., 
TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND INVESTING SEPTEMBER 2006 (2006), available at 
http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/trends_09_06.html. At the end of 2002, mutual funds held 
$6.4 trillion in assets, INV. CO. INST., TRENDS IN MUTUAL FUND INVESTING JANUARY 2003 
(2003), available at http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/arctrends/trends_01_03.html, an increase of about 
50% in four years. Thus, as a percentage of GDP, mutual fund assets increased from 64% to 85% 
from 2002 to 2006. U.S. GDP, supra note 3. 
 55. See Diana B. Henriques and Joseph Kahn, Back from the Brink; Lessons of a Long, Hot 
Summer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at C3. 
 56. Daniel K. Liffmann, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the Investment Advisers 
Act, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2147, 2168 (2005). 
 57. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 37 (2003). 
 58. See, e.g., Henriques, supra note 55. 
 59. See generally Henriques, supra note 55. 
2007] Hedge Fund Regulation 227 
2. Hedge Fund Failures: Long-Term Capital and Amaranth 
Advisors 
The near-collapse of LTCM in 1998 demonstrated the risk an 
unregulated hedge fund market posed to the economy. LTCM leveraged its 
assets 25 times.60 Thus, of the fund’s total portfolio value, $5 billion was 
from investors, while the remaining $120 billion was borrowed to enhance 
returns on equity.61 Several factors threatened the collapse of LTCM, 
including, significantly, a Russian threat to withhold payment of credit 
obligations and a devaluation of the ruble.62 This threat sent a wave of panic 
through worldwide debt markets, including countries on which LTCM had 
wagered substantial leveraged capital.63 LTCM lost hundreds of millions of 
dollars on junk bond exposure and on mortgage pools.64 Further, although 
LTCM was primarily invested in fixed income securities, it held $6.5 
billion in equity, and was hit again by declining stock prices.65 
The combination of events seriously compromised LTCM’s ability to 
repay the investors who had lent it $120 billion with which to trade. Its 
borrowing contracts provided that upon default, all of the other lenders 
could also call their loans to LTCM.66 In the end, the Federal Reserve 
brokered a deal with investment banks to essentially buy out the fund and 
prevent a financial disaster.67 
The damage was done. A report issued by the Government Accounting 
Office after LTCM’s bailout stated that the “LTCM crisis prompted strong 
reactions from virtually all large firms that were counterparties of hedge 
funds and an increased sense of awareness regarding risk management 
policies and procedures.”68 The report also noted that accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen LLP69 conducted a study which highlighted three specific 
changes that occurred because of the collapse of LTCM: first, “[t]he 
number of banks and securities and futures firms doing business with hedge 
funds has decreased, and the business is substantially more concentrated 
among the largest, globally active firms;” 70 second, “[t]hese firms have 
focused on their risk management activities, including obtaining more 
complete information through required data reports and on-site visits; 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at 12. 
 63. Henriques, supra note 55. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 13. 
 69. Arthur Andersen is now defunct for reasons unrelated to this issue. David G. Savage, High 
Court Says it Wasn’t Proved that Defunct Accounting Giant Arthur Andersen Intended to Commit 
a Crime in the Enron Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at A1. 
 70. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 14. 
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tightening credit terms and increasing margin requirements; and improving 
risk models and recognizing the risks of unanticipated market events;”71 and 
third, “hedge funds have become more forthcoming with meaningful data 
and information ensuring greater transparency to their activities.”72 These 
changes illustrate the industry’s concern for poorly managed hedge funds. 
However, these changes also indicate that the LTCM crisis benefited 
the market: first, since fewer banks are willing to work with hedge funds, it 
will be more difficult for hedge funds to acquire dangerous levels of 
leveraged capital; second, implementing internal and external controls is a 
safeguard that puts the onus on investors, counterparties and the hedge fund 
itself; and third, the increased transparency of hedge funds provides the 
informational access to hedge funds that SEC registration would attempt to 
provide.73 As opposed to increased SEC regulation, which may now only 
occur through legislation, the market is already able to quickly create 
incentives for hedge funds to adopt their own regulation. These built-in 
market controls protect investors and the economy. SEC regulation would 
be redundant if the market can already effectively regulate itself. 
Amaranth Advisors (Amaranth) was another hedge fund that recently 
collapsed, lending some support to proponents of hedge fund regulation; 
however, the minimal impact Amaranth’s collapse had on the markets 
further demonstrates that hedge fund regulation is unnecessary.74 Amaranth 
invested heavily in derivatives linked to future energy prices.75 Energy 
prices began to fall in September 2006, instigated by better-than-expected 
weather,76 and the fund started hemorrhaging assets.77 Unable to liquidate 
its positions fast enough, Amaranth lost $6.5 billion in two weeks.78 Unlike 
LTCM, however, the repercussions of Amaranth’s downfall were limited 
primarily to its investors.79 The derivative positions of the $9 billion fund 
were sold to other investors and the rest was returned to Amaranth’s 
investors.80 This collapse, however, did not threaten the economy at large.81 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11, at 72,061. 
 74. For a general discussion on the political regulatory effects stemming from Amaranth’s 
collapse, see Avital Louria Hahn, The SEC’s Last Shot at Hedge Fund Regulation, INVESTMENT 
DEALERS’ DIGEST, Oct. 23, 2006. 
 75. Jonathan Davis, Amaranth: How to Lose $6 Billion in a Fortnight, THE SPECTATOR, Oct. 
28, 2006. 
 76. There were fewer hurricanes than predicted that year, which kept energy prices lower than 
they would have been after a severe hurricane season. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; see also Hahn, supra note 74 (noting that “Amaranth’s loss was relatively well 
contained”). 
 80. Davis, supra note 75. 
 81. See Hahn, supra note 74. 
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Both LTCM and Amaranth demonstrate the potential threat that hedge 
funds pose to the U.S. economy. However, neither example demonstrates 
the need for hedge fund regulation because neither potential threat came to 
fruition; both cases were solved without any serious harm to the economy.82 
Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, recently expressed skepticism 
about giving regulators more oversight, indicating that allowing hedge 
funds and trading partners to manage risk in the sector made “economic 
sense.”83 History shows that the market can most effectively regulate hedge 
funds; efforts to regulate hedge funds to avoid systemic risk are not 
currently justified. 
The systemic risk posed by hedge funds has the broadest relevance, but 
the SEC is also tasked with protecting investors, including hedge fund 
investors.84 Investor protection does not justify increased hedge fund 
regulation because hedge fund investors are a small, elite segment of the 
investing public.85 Further, an inquiry must be made as to whether the SEC 
is financially and tactically able to handle the diverse and complex hedge 
fund industry. 
B. INVESTOR RISK: REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS IS NOT A 
JUSTIFIABLE SEC EXPENSE 
1. The SEC is Not Equipped to Regulate Hedge Funds. 
Regulating hedge funds would require the SEC to devote an unknown, 
but potentially substantial, amount of additional time and money to monitor 
the growing industry. There are approximately 8,000 hedge funds currently 
operating in the U.S. and the number appears to be growing.86 The SEC has 
a relatively small budget of $888 million,87 which is 0.036% of the U.S. 
2005 fiscal year budget outlays of $2.5 trillion.88 The 3,100-employee 
agency has limited resources to fulfill its mission “to protect investors, 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”89 The SEC already appears stretched too thin, even without a 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Henriques, supra note 55; Davis, supra note 75. 
 83. Jeremy Grant, Rethink in the U.S. on Hedge Fund Rules, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at 21. 
 84. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
[hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate] (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate 
capital formation.”). 
 85. See infra note 97. 
 86. See, e.g., Kit R. Roane, Hedging Their Debts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Apr. 10, 
2006, at 38. 
 87. Frequently Requested FOIA Document: SEC Budget History vs. Actual Expenses, 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). 
 88. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2007 (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/pdf/budget/tables.pdf. 
 89. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 84. 
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commitment to implement increased hedge fund regulation.90 In 2006 the 
SEC lost 155 employees and, as a result, the amount of enforcement cases 
brought by the agency dropped by 9%.91 Further, the SEC had a budget 
shortfall and so had to institute a hiring freeze.92 The SEC’s strained 
capacity seems incapable of adjusting to the increased work-load hedge 
fund regulation would create, especially when it is unclear that the 
additional strain would enable the SEC to fulfill its mission to protect 
investors and financial markets. 
In order to be able to fulfill its mission, the SEC’s small budget 
allotment must be efficiently spent; the crucial question is, whether 
devoting more resources to regulate the self-regulated hedge fund industry 
would be worthwhile. Of 3,100 SEC employees, only 495 are responsible 
for 8,000 mutual funds owned by 91 million investors.93 A 1996 Senate 
report noted that “the number of registered [mutual fund] investment 
advisers has increased by over 500% since 1980, far outstripping the 
growth in the Commission’s examination resources.94 As a result, smaller 
investment advisers are now examined, on average, once every 44 years—
amounting to virtually no regulation at all.”95 The thinly stretched SEC may 
not be able to handle an additional 8,000 hedge funds. With its budget 
shortfall, it seems unlikely that the SEC is currently able to realistically 
initiate a taskforce to monitor the huge hedge fund industry. 
Whether the SEC’s budget would be effective in preventing an 
economic collapse by regulating hedge funds is, at best, speculative. It is 
not worth implementing a regulatory system that will burden hedge fund 
investors both through SEC fees, and the cost of registration, which would 
be paid by investors through diminished returns.96 Protecting hedge fund 
investors is not a sufficient goal to justify this burden. 
2. Protection of Sophisticated Investors is Unnecessary 
SEC regulation over hedge funds is unnecessary for the protection of 
hedge fund investors because hedge funds are made up of investors meeting 
stringent financial requirements and who are presumed to be more 
investment-savvy individuals. Hedge fund investors are institutions and 
                                                                                                                 
 90. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson, Staff Reduced Because of Budget Crunch, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 
2006, at D03. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Fiscal 2005 Appropriations Request for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of William H. Donaldson, Chariman, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ 
ts033104whd.htm. 
 94. S. Rep. No. 104-293, at 3 (1996). 
 95. Id. 
 96. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-1. 
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accredited investors, the latter of which must have a net worth of over 
$1,000,000 or have, in each of the last two years, earned more than 
$200,000.97 Surely wealthy investors are no less deserving of the benefits of 
government regulation, in general, but hedge funds in particular have 
developed with very little regulation, and these investors have still 
knowingly partaken in their success. 
Also, funds of funds—investment companies that diversify risk by 
buying shares in other hedge funds98 — comprise a large segment of hedge 
fund assets.99 Funds of funds generally register with the SEC because their 
investors are not accredited investors and because they generally have over 
25 investors.100 Thus, because a large amount of capital in funds of funds is 
already registered, regulating the underlying funds would be redundant 
regulation. The burden of additional regulation on the hedge fund industry 
could be substantial.101 The burden would likely limit the effectiveness of 
hedge funds and would not likely achieve putative goals, namely preventing 
malfeasance among hedge funds. 
Mutual funds, which are substantially similar in form to hedge funds,102 
are currently regulated by the SEC.103 Under the Company Act, mutual 
funds must provide information such as the extent to which the fund intends 
to engage in specific activities, a recital of all investments and their general 
policies.104 Investors who seek the presumed protection of SEC regulation 
can invest in any of the 8,000 registered mutual funds. Hedge funds have 
been exempted from this registration, and so have been vehicles for those 
who seek greater absolute returns in exchange for greater risk. Investor 
                                                                                                                 
 97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2004). There are 2.7 million individuals in North America 
who meet the $1 million net assets threshold. Press Release, Capgemini, World Wealth Report 
2005 Discloses that Number of “Millionaires” Grows by Over 7% to 8.3 Million Worldwide (June 
9, 2005), available at http://www.us.capgemini.com/industries/ind_pressrelease.asp?IndID= 
4&ID=489. The United States population is just over 300 million. CIA: The World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html. High net-worth 
individuals, therefore, account for just under 1% of all Americans. 
 98. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 99. 
 99. Id. at 44 n.154 (“FOHFs represented approximately 27 percent of hedge fund assets, 
compared to 20 percent the year before.”). 
 100. MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, THE SEC’S REGISTRATION PROPOSAL: THE PUBLIC 
COMMENTARY—A SUMMARY 2 (2004) [hereinafter MFA PROPOSAL]; STAFF REPORT, supra note 
24, at 67–69. 
 101. Matthew A. Chambers and Alexandra Poe, Regulatory Oversight of Hedge Fund Advisers, 
1517 PRAC. LAW INST. 467, 471–77. A recent Practicing Law Institute publication suggests that 
the registration requirements would be substantial. Among the types of regulation suggested are 1) 
compliance programs where hedge funds would create and execute procedures to comply with 
SEC rules; 2) the adoption of codes of ethics; 3) portfolio management procedures and valuation 
procedures; 4) record-keeping requirements; 5) compulsory communications with investors and 6) 
increased vigilance of short-selling. Id. 
 102. See supra Part II. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a)–(b) (2000). 
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appetite for hedge funds has not abated105 and unregulated hedge funds 
should continue to be an investment option for qualified investors. 
3. Hedge Fund Regulation Will Not Effectively Prevent 
Malfeasance 
Preventing illegal activity is not a justifiable end to be obtained by 
further hedge fund regulation. SEC regulation may simplify the process of 
uncovering illegal activity, but registration would not change the legal 
guidelines trading firms must already follow; hedge funds would still be 
subject to anti-fraud restrictions.106 For example, the hedge fund manager’s 
fiduciary duty to the investors requires that managers fully disclose to their 
clients all matters regarding the fund’s business practices, fees and conflicts 
of interest.107 
From 1999 to 2004, before the SEC implemented increased regulation, 
the SEC brought 51 cases against hedge funds or their managers alleging 
that they defrauded investors.108 Further, 400 funds (5% of all funds 
currently operating) have been investigated by the SEC in some form.109 
These non-regulatory controls have thus proven effective in uncovering and 
taking action against misconduct. If the current scheme has worked to 
prevent misconduct and has allowed hedge funds to operate unhindered by 
regulation, there is little need to spend the time and money to implement 
new, more burdensome regulation. 
Further, hedge funds may more effectively self-regulate than other 
investments that cater to large segments of the public. Each hedge fund 
investor who has over $1 million invested110 likely has more bargaining 
power (through the threat of redemption, which lowers the hedge fund’s 
assets) than the average mutual fund investor, who may have far less 
invested with the mutual fund manager. Fewer and more influential 
investors will be a constant centripetal force on potential deviant hedge 
fund activity. Investors may also control hedge fund managers by requiring 
that the fund register with the SEC.111 Funds of funds executives have stated 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See supra Part I. 
 106. See MFA PROPOSAL, supra note 100. 
 107. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-15 (citing Section 204 of the Investment 
Advisers Act [15 USC 80b-4]). 
 108. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 11, at 72,056. 
 109. Id. at 72,057. 
 110. The minimum investment of most hedge funds is usually $1 to 2 million. Investor 
Protection and the Regulation of Hedge Funds Advisers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of William H. Donaldson, 
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at 
http://edgar.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts071504whd.htm. 
 111. A requirement by a hedge fund investor could come in one of two ways: 1) an investor, 
more likely an influential one, could explicitly require that a hedge fund manager register with the 
SEC or; 2) an investor could require registration by its actions by choosing as an investment a 
fund that takes the initiative to register with the SEC. 
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that they declined investing with Amaranth112 because of its lack of 
disclosure.113 Thus, since the market will, in some instances, provide 
incentives for hedge funds to register, compulsory SEC regulation imposes 
an unnecessary requirement on the hedge fund industry. Aside from the 
potential ineffectiveness of hedge fund regulation, legislation that could 
alter the shape of hedge funds and their place in the market could actually 
be detrimental to the current system. 
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT FURTHER REGULATION 
A. INCREASED REGULATION WILL MAKE HEDGE FUNDS A LESS-
ATTRACTIVE INVESTMENT OPTION 
1. Problems with Further Legislation 
Currently, hedge funds do not have to register under either the 
Company Act or the Advisers Act.114 The SEC attempted to regulate hedge 
funds through the Advisers Act.115 However, it was unsuccessful in 
implementing regulation because Goldstein invalidated the SEC’s 
interpretation of the term “client.”116 Since the SEC is concerned with the 
hedge fund’s activities and not the manager per se, the route for 
implementing hedge fund regulation would logically be the Investment 
Company Act, not the Investment Adviser’s Act.117 However, because the 
regulation required under the Company Act is more stringent than under the 
Advisers Act,118 regulation under the Company Act could over-regulate. 
Alan Greenspan, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, warned about the 
potential that Congress would take the opportunity to expand hedge fund 
regulation beyond the purported registration requirements imposed prior to 
Goldstein: “Should registration fail to achieve the intended objectives, 
pressure may well become irresistible to expand the SEC’s regulatory reach 
from hedge fund advisers to hedge funds themselves.”119 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See infra Part III for a brief discussion about Amaranth. 
 113. Henny Sender & Gregory Zuckerman, Moving the Market—Tracking the Numbers / Street 
Sleuth: Amaranth Natural-Gas Losses May Have Far-Reaching Effect—Investors in Other 
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C3. 
 114. See supra Part II. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 117. The Company Act indicates that activities under its purview are investing, reinvesting, and 
trading in securities. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a) (2000). Meanwhile, activities associated with 
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 118. See § 80a-8(b); cf. § 80b-3(c)(1)–(2). 
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on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 43 (2004) (response to a written question of 
Senator Crapo from Alan Greenspan). 
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The court in Goldstein further warned that the sort of regulation with 
which mutual funds must comply does not comport with many hedge fund 
strategies: “[Mutual funds] are . . . foreclosed from trading on margin or 
engaging in short sales, and must secure shareholder approval to take on 
significant debt or invest in certain types of assets, such as real estate or 
commodities. These transactions are all core elements of most hedge funds’ 
trading strategies.”120 
The cost of enacting new legislation and the cost of implementing 
regulatory changes if legislation is enacted are both unclear. These costs 
would fall on hedge funds to pay SEC fees and to implement registration 
systems, both adding to the already high fees hedge fund investors pay.121 
This could ultimately affect the desirability of hedge funds because their fee 
structure would yield a lower return to hedge fund investors.122 
Regulated hedge funds would be subject to more limitations than those 
that are not. For example, increased regulation may consist of limits on 
management fees, such as are imposed upon mutual funds.123 This may 
dissuade talented hedge fund managers from starting hedge funds if the 
incentive of lucrative fees is diminished by excessive regulation. Further, 
because managers are beholden to their investors to make prudent and fair 
investing decisions, managers who oppose duplicative SEC oversight could 
move the hedge fund offshore to avoid the oversight of the SEC. Dana 
Johnson, senior vice president and chief economist at Comerica Bank, 
recently warned in a Wall Street Journal article that some hedge funds 
would be pushed “offshore if we tried to regulate with a heavy hand. . . . [It 
is b]etter to have them onshore with light regulation.”124 
2. Benefits of Hedge Funds’ Distinctness from Mutual Funds 
Hedge funds have delivered numerous benefits to the global financial 
markets. Hedge funds invest in new and often undercapitalized markets.125 
This enhances liquidity in less traditional markets. Hedge funds also often 
purchase derivatives126 and take short positions,127 which increases 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 (citation omitted). 
 121. Hedge funds typically charge 1-5% of assets under management in management fees and 
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Feb. 22, 2005, at C3. 
 122. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at B-1. 
 123. See id. at 3. 
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 125. STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 4–5. 
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reliability to market prices and may limit irrational security appreciation.128 
As Joseph McLaughlin, a partner at Sidley Austin, LLP, testified before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee: 
Hedge funds enhance market liquidity and contribute to pricing efficiency 
and market stability. Hedge funds also foster financial innovation and risk 
sophistication among the market participants with which they deal. . . . 
[H]edge funds’ ability to deliver these benefits to the financial 
marketplace depends in large measure on their ability to engage in short 
sales and related activities.129 
The putative benefits of hedge fund regulation do not justify a new 
scheme of regulation of an industry that, at its core, has been distinguished 
from other investments by its lack of regulation. Hedge funds have 
provided value to financial markets. Removing attributes that distinguish 
hedge funds and mutual funds may eliminate an environment where 
wealthy investors have allowed managers to invest in new and risky 
markets.130 Talented managers may be dissuaded from starting funds, or 
from personally investing in the funds they manage.131 Investors may find 
new vehicles in which to invest that are more distinct from mutual funds. 
Dressing hedge funds up as mutual funds by imposing strict regulation will 
hinder investing innovation and will reduce the benefits hedge funds have 
provided to the economy. 
Hedge funds are a concept defined by what they are not.132 As the SEC 
tightens its regulatory hold on hedge funds, a major distinction between 
hedge funds and mutual funds begins to vanish. Wealthy investors who 
formerly favored hedge funds over mutual funds for the unique opportunity 
of a cutting-edge investment will find new ways to distinguish themselves 
from ordinary investors. 
With regulation foreseeably driving away wealthy investors, areas of 
the market in which hedge funds invest may become undercapitalized. 
Hedge funds invest in a wide array of securities and take varying positions. 
For example, hedge funds invest in the second-lien loan market and in 
corporate bankruptcies.133 Hedge funds have also increasingly been a major 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Taking a short position means “[b]orrowing a security (or commodity futures contract) 
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creditor to numerous markets from retail to technology to the automotive 
sectors, providing much-needed capital and reducing lending costs.134 
Markets that might otherwise go unfunded are capitalized by hedge funds 
willing to take risk in these markets for the potential upside benefit. Further, 
hedge funds often hedge their portfolios by trading both long and short 
positions.135 Increased hedge fund regulation could disrupt trade strategies 
and encourage a precipitous flow of capital out of hedge funds and out of 
the markets they support. 
By making hedge funds indistinguishable from mutual funds, regulation 
could also have a deleterious effect on hedge fund managers’ participation 
in their funds. While hedge fund managers are notoriously well paid, with 
top earners earning $1 billion or more in a year,136 they also invest 
substantial assets of their own in the funds they manage,137 which may 
induce investor confidence in their vested managers. When hedge fund 
managers are invested in their own fund, they are naturally less likely to 
engage in dubious or even fraudulent trading. Overly burdensome 
regulation could have two primary effects: 1) managers may refrain from 
starting hedge funds; or 2) managers may refrain from investing in their 
own fund. Increased legislation, therefore, could negatively impact the role 
of the autonomous hedge fund manager and hamper hedge fund growth in 
the U.S. 
Further, while the American hedge fund industry is currently the 
biggest in the world, hedge fund activity in Hong Kong and London has 
grown rapidly.138 While London and Hong Kong have smaller hedge fund 
                                                                                                                 
In this market, if a borrower defaults, the primary lender gets repaid before the 
secondary lender; in exchange for shouldering this risk, that second-lien lender earns a 
higher interest rate from the borrower. . . . Hedge funds have also grown prominent in 
corporate bankruptcies, where they can make a cheap bet on a company’s recovery by 
buying its debt. 
Id. 
 134. Roane, supra note 86, at 38. 
 135. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 24, at 33–34. By taking short positions hedge funds sell a 
security loaned to it and then have to buy it back later to cover that loan. The short seller, hopes 
for a depreciation in market value so it can buy the security back at a lower price, pocketing the 
difference. Short Sales, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2006). 
A short sale is generally the sale of a stock you do not own. Investors who sell short 
believe the price of the stock will fall. If the price drops, you can buy the stock at the 
lower price and make a profit. If the price of the stock rises and you buy it back later at 
the higher price, you will incur a loss. 
Id. 
 136. Adam Shell, $363M Is Average Pay for Top Hedge Fund Managers, USA TODAY, May 
26, 2006, at 1B. 
 137. See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 23, at A-1. 
 138. See Heather Timmons, New York Isn’t the World’s Undisputed Financial Capital, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2006, at C1; Stephen Schurr, Hedge Funds: London Wins Prize for Nurturing 
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markets than the U.S., both economies (and others, like Singapore and 
Australia) compete for economic freedom; Hong Kong and Singapore are 
considered more economically free by the Index of Economic Freedom and 
the U.K. ranks number six, behind the U.S. at number four.139 Further, 
Hong Kong, U.K., Ireland, Luxembourg, Estonia, The Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany are all considered more free specifically in terms of 
“investment freedom” than the U.S.140 The Index of Economic Freedom is a 
publication by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal that 
ranks countries’ economic freedom using several criteria, including the 
amount of governmental regulation.141 The report notes in its methodology 
that “[h]eavy bank regulation reduces opportunities and restricts economic 
freedom.”142 Already lagging in its ability to foster investment freedom, 
increased hedge fund regulation in the U.S. could create a less desirable 
environment in which to foster hedge fund growth, driving hedge funds 
abroad. Illustrative of this effect is a recent SEC decision to deregulate 
certain Sarbanes-Oxley requirements by loosening auditing requirements 
and making foreign companies’ withdrawals from American markets 
easier.143 The SEC deregulated for fear that its regulatory reach would 
hamper investment in the U.S.144 Similarly, overregulation of hedge funds 
could negatively impact the desirability of the U.S. market. 
The SEC has claimed regulation would have minimal effects on hedge 
funds,145 but because its attempt to work around the existing bars to hedge 
fund registration was invalidated,146 the next step is likely legislation. 
Congress could take the opportunity, for simplicity’s sake, to revamp 
existing laws to include hedge funds within the same realm of mutual fund 
regulation. Increased regulatory oversight would likely be a result of further 
legislative action, which would negatively affect the hedge fund industry 
and could result in instability in financial markets. 
V. PROPOSALS TO LIMIT HEDGE FUND RISK 
1. PREVENT EXCESSIVE LEVERAGE THROUGH HEDGE FUND 
COUNTERPARTIES 
One problem that seems to be common among the financial risks 
associated with hedge funds is excess leverage. An un-leveraged hedge 
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fund poses a risk only to investors, who can lose their invested capital. An 
un-leveraged hedge fund may not be practical for many funds, though, 
because leveraging can be an effective way to capitalize on interest-rate 
arbitrage. However, the more a fund is leveraged, the more volatile the risk 
becomes.147 Excessive leverage is a problem not only to hedge fund 
investors, but to banks as well, since the banks risk losing the credit they 
have extended if a hedge fund cannot pay. 
In response to the LTCM collapse in 1999, Patrick Parkinson, Associate 
Director of Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve 
testified before Congress that the 
primary responsibility for addressing the weaknesses in risk management 
practices that were evident in the LTCM episode rests with the private 
financial institutions—a relatively small number of U.S. and foreign banks 
and broker-dealers, most of which were LTCM’s counterparties. . . . 
[P]rudential supervisors and regulators have a responsibility to help to 
ensure that the processes that banks and securities firms utilize to manage 
risk are commensurate with the size and complexity of their portfolios and 
responsive to changes in financial market conditions.148 
Similarly, a joint report by the Department of the Treasury, The Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission indicated that the most effective way to contain 
excess leverage was not by regulating hedge funds, but through the 
discipline of hedge fund counterparties, such as the banks who lend hedge 
funds capital with which to invest.149 Significantly, the report goes on to 
note that while these disciplinary controls will not always be effective (for 
example in the case of LTCM), “the failures and losses that have occurred 
have been small relative to the benefits of a market economy.”150 
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Kurt Schacht, Managing Director of Chartered Financial Analyst 
Institute noted that “greater disclosure by regulated counterparty entities . . . 
will reveal any serious imbalances in a market” and that U.K. authorities are 
also looking at ways to prevent systemic risk by more closely regulating the 
counterparties who they already regulate.151 Of the parties who contribute to 
excessive leverage, banks and other counterparties, which are already 
regulated, seem to be the most efficient party to monitor. 
2. INCREASE REQUIREMENTS FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS 
A possible alternative to further regulation under the federal securities 
laws is to update the requirement one must meet to be an accredited 
investor. Currently accredited investors include those that earn over 
$200,000 a year or have over $1 million in net worth.152 These numbers 
were formulated over twenty years ago and are outdated.153 The number of 
people meeting this threshold has increased significantly because of 
inflation.154 Thus, those eligible to invest in hedge funds are more in 
number and less wealthy than those of twenty years ago in real terms. 
Hedge funds can be successful in an unregulated market when their 
investors are sophisticated enough to be an effective counterpart to the 
hedge fund manager. Sophisticated investors require less assistance from 
the SEC to protect their investments. Further, wealthy investors may be 
more willing to risk their investment for non-market-correlative returns. 
This allows for more complex or cutting-edge investments, which, as noted 
above, adds liquidity to the market. 
The definition of an accredited investor should be raised, at least to 
reflect inflation over the last twenty years. This will limit the number of 
people who are able to invest in an unregulated hedge fund market and will 
also keep the hedge fund industry nimble and efficient. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Hedge funds have become omnipresent across equity and bond markets, 
have become active in less-traditional derivative and arbitrage strategies, 
and have invested in retail, automotive and even the entertainment 
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industry.155 Hedge funds have enjoyed incredible growth, especially at the 
end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.156 With 
well over $1 trillion floating through the industry, the odds of financial risk 
would seem naturally to increase. Indeed, hedge funds have shown some 
potential to harm the economy and individual investors, but whether there is 
an appropriate way to stem these risks has not been proven. 
Most hedge funds have avoided regulation under the federal securities 
laws. As the hedge fund industry has grown in size and in potential risk to 
the economy, the SEC has become increasingly concerned that it should act 
to prevent serious harm. It promulgated its hedge fund rule designed to 
bring hedge funds under its regulatory reach even though it seemed clear 
that the authorizing statute did not authorize it to take this measure. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals invalidated the SEC’s faulty hedge fund 
rule.157 With no further action since, a likely next step is legislation, should 
Congress decide hedge fund regulation is necessary. There are two 
problems that further legislation which implements hedge fund regulation 
could pose. One, this legislation could over-regulate and hinder hedge 
funds’ growth and effectiveness. Over-regulation would be detrimental to 
the economy because it would deprive the economy of the benefits hedge 
funds have provided through their aggressive and innovative trading 
strategies. Two, the legislation could be interminably time-consuming and 
expensive, yet still prove to be ineffective. 
Hedge fund investors are limited to those who are presumed to be 
sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors are more able to protect 
their investments from errant hedge fund managers and also have the power 
to control managers through the threat of redemptions of large amounts of 
capital from the fund. Further, hedge funds are already subject to anti-fraud 
regulations. Enforcement against hedge funds has proved workable in the 
current self-regulated environment. 
The benefits of increased regulation are dubious and over-regulation 
could hinder hedge funds’ ability to add value to the economy. The costs 
associated with implementation and execution of an unknown regulatory 
environment is not justified. 
Excessive hedge fund leverage can magnify losses to extreme levels. 
The counterparty banks that lend hedge funds money should be restrained 
from making excessive and potentially dangerous loans. Further, hedge 
funds have operated in a mostly unregulated market because they have only 
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accepted institutional and wealthy investors. This ensures that the investors 
are sophisticated enough to handle an unregulated investment, and also that 
hedge fund investors will have enough influence to effectively monitor 
hedge fund managers. Hopefully, this will prevent malfeasance. The 
financial requirements of investors eligible to invest in hedge funds should 
thus be strengthened to reflect inflation over the last twenty years. 
Since the current hedge fund regulatory scheme has worked 
successfully and has benefited the economy, it should be untouched. Private 
hedge funds should be able to interact with their private investors without 
regulatory interference. To encourage innovation and effectiveness, the 
hedge fund industry should not currently be regulated by the SEC. 
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